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Discovery of Social Network Data in Litigation
Jeffrey Richter

I.

Introduction
The advent of the digital age and its subsequent proliferation have rapidly reshaped

society, forever altering how individuals interact with the world and one another on a daily basis.
Social media in particular has significantly transformed societal norms, as people the world over
have been forced to adapt to constantly changing technology and the consequences that
accompany it. After breaking down the barriers of nearly all facets of everyday life, it is of no
surprise that social media has now infiltrated the confines of the courtroom, and in particular
civil litigation. While individuals take full advantage of social media sites to voice their opinions
and share the minutia of their daily lives, once an opposing party seeks to pry into these
accounts, privacy concerns are quickly raised. This new and developing technology is now
challenging courts throughout the country to balance these privacy concerns with an established
affinity for broad pretrial discovery. The resulting balancing process is creating a legal and
ethical minefield for practicing attorneys seeking access to this information.
As the Ninth Circuit aptly stated, “[t]he Internet has opened new channels of
communication and self-expression… While such intermediaries enable the user-driven digital
age, they also create new legal problems.”1 Given the rise of social media, lawyers practicing in
all fields have been forced to acquire a better understanding of the resource or risk substantial
1

Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 2007).

harm to their clients. Attempts to excavate useful information from the social media landscape
have raised new concerns about attorney ethics and the rules of discovery, which were drafted
decades ago before technology like this was even conceived let alone commonplace. A relative
lack of consistent judicial precedent on the discoverability of such evidence has not hindered the
development of the use of social media information in litigation, as evidenced by the 88
published opinions this past September alone in which evidence mined from social media was of
critical importance.2
While no hard line rules currently exist for evidence taken from social media platforms, a
common theme does seem to be shared among the jurisdictions that have dealt with the issue:
individuals who willingly choose to share information with others on platforms designed to
broadcast these postings into cyberspace cannot rightfully seek shelter behind privacy concerns
when those postings later prove damaging. The broad latitude afforded litigants by the current
rules of discoverability and the traditional preference for broad pretrial discovery have been used
to justify intrusions into both the public and private sectors of individuals’ social media profiles.
With the constant and rapid transformation of technology and the advent of products such as
Google Glass, there may come a time when new discovery rules may have to be drafted, rules
that are specifically geared toward social media. Rules that are centrally focused on social media
would allow for uniformity, practicality, and comprehensibility, while also bringing an end to the
bevy of litigation that is currently plaguing the judicial system. For now, however, courts seem
complacent to use the existing rules of discovery and the rules of professional conduct to answer
the questions of what content is discoverable and how that content can be discovered legally and
ethically.
2

John Patzakis, Social Media Case Law Update: The Acceleration Continues, Next Generation eDiscovery Law &
Tech Blog (Oct. 4, 2013, 8:42 AM), http:// blog.x1discovery.com/2013/10/04/social-media-case-law-update-theacceleration-continues.
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II. What is Social Media?
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, social media refers to “electronic
communication through which users create online communities to share information, ideas,
personal messages, and other content.”3 The American Bar Association has defined social media
more broadly as “any tool or service that uses the internet to facilitate conversations.”4
Regardless of the definition, it is clear that the phrase encompasses social networking sites like
Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn, blogs, forums, photo-sharing sites like Flickr, and videosteaming websites like internet giant YouTube. Social media as a digital platform for social
interaction is a relatively young phenomenon but has experienced explosive growth over the last
decade. It has never been more popular than it is today. As of March 2013, Facebook, which is
not even ten years old yet, had 1.11 billion active users, with 699 million of these users posting
on average at least once per day.5 Moreover, there have been over 170 billion tweets since 2006,
and over 6 billion hours of video are watched each month on YouTube with 100 hours of video
being uploaded to the site every minute.6 As the sheer number of social media platforms and
their popularity continue to rise, understanding the nature and functions of the tools at the core of
the phenomenon has been crucial to a legal community lambasted with legal and ethical issues.
Social media websites exist primarily to foster and enhance open communication. The
unrestricted and public nature of services like Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter, allow and
encourage users to instantaneously communicate and share information with not only their

3

Social Media Definition, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited December 3, 2013).
4
Catherine Sanders Reach, A Guided Tour of Social Media, Am. Bar Ass'n Legal Tech. Res. Ctr., 2 (2010), http://
apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/lpl/downloads/a_guided_tour_of_social_ media.pdf.
5
Kim Garst, Social Media Grows Up, HuffingtonPost.com (Sept. 11, 2013, 12:37 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kim-garst/social-media-grows-up_b_3906360.html (last visited December 3,
2013).
6
Doug Gross, Library of Congress Digs into 170 Billion Tweets, CNN.com (Jan. 7, 2013, 12:18PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/07/tech/social-media/library-congress-twitter (last visited December 3, 2013);
Statistics, YouTube.com, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited December 3, 2013).
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personal friends but also acquaintances and the general public as well. Today, information that
was once considered private is being broadcasted via social media to an entire world of strangers.
By promoting the public exposure of thoughts, feelings, and other personal content, the
fundamental nature and characteristics of social media make it a ripe treasure trove of
information for attorneys in all fields of practice.
Social media not only promotes the sharing of information and open dialogue, but
generally, this personal information is recorded and stored, sometimes permanently.
Furthermore, each posting is often stamped with a date, time, and location of the individual at the
time of posting. These features can give lawyers unfettered access to a bevy of information that
is easy to quickly collect, store, and interpret. With this information readily available at the click
of a mouse, what once could only be discovered through a lengthy and potentially arduous
process, can now be found by combing through a collection of documents that can be
downloaded in mere seconds. Even though the source of this information is rapidly advancing
and groundbreaking technology, until now courts have chosen to use the existing rules of
discovery to determine what evidence can be subjected to discovery in civil litigation.
III. The Existing Rules of Discovery
In response to a wildfire of issues concerning electronically stored information, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 2006 to better handle issues regarding
computer-based discovery. Rather than following this path and drafting new rules, lawmakers
have instead chosen to allow courts to mold social media issues into the existing discovery rules.
These courts have generally refused to look upon this type of evidence any differently than its
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predecessors. As one court stated, “[t]he fact that the [d]efendant is seeking social networking
information as opposed to traditional discovery materials does not change the Court’s analysis.”7
The current rules of discovery, both in New Jersey and at the federal level, are broadsweeping rules that favor the admissibility of pretrial evidence. These rules focus on the content
of the information sought as opposed to the information’s source. Given that the rules were
drafted to be purposefully broad, they often offer courts little guidance when determining
whether certain evidence is properly discoverable. The gatekeeping function these rules were
meant to serve has thus been significantly nullified by broad judicial interpretation that has
afforded litigants wide latitude in the pretrial discovery process under the supposition that this
better serves equality and the judicial process as a whole.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, whether or not evidence is discoverable ultimately
breaks down into an issue of relevancy. According to Rule 26(b), “any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense is discoverable.”8 Basically, if the information being
sought is relevant to the claims or defenses of the parties to the case, then it should be
discoverable. At the pretrial stage this creates an incredibly vast scope of information that must
be turned over to the opposing party.
Similar to the broad federal rules of discovery, New Jersey’s discovery rules are to be
construed liberally in favor of broad pretrial discovery.9 The primary rule of discovery in New
Jersey is Rule 4:10-2 which reads:

7

Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 11-6323 ADS AKT, 2013 WL 2897054
(E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013) citing EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 2010)
(“Discovery of [social networking postings] requires the application of basic discovery principles in a novel
context.”).
8
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
9
See Jenkins v. Rainner, 69 N.J. 50 (1976) (“Our court system has long been committed to the view that essential
justice is better achieved when there has been full disclosure so that the parties are conversant with all the available
facts.”).
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Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope
of discovery is as follows:
(a) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; nor is it ground for
objection that the examining party has knowledge of the matters as to which discovery is
sought.10
Under the rule, courts possess the power to order a party to produce all relevant, unprivileged
information which could potentially lead to the discovery of relevant evidence.11 While this
seemingly provides the court with broad-sweeping powers, a significant shortcoming of the
rule’s language is that it fails to define the term “relevant” which is vital to a proper
understanding of the rule’s scope. Under N.J.R.E. 401, however, relevant evidence is defined as
“evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the
determination of the action.”12 Therefore, in order to establish that evidence is discoverable at
the state or federal level, a party must simply satisfy the rather low burden of demonstrating that
the evidence is somehow relevant to the issues involved in the case.
IV. Relevancy in the Social Media Landscape
Because of the sheer amount of information contained in a litigant’s social media accounts,
asking a party to turn over the entirety of his or her account will no doubt produce both relevant
and irrelevant evidence. Courts cannot rightfully ask a litigant to turn over all of this irrelevant
information, and they are therefore struggling with delineating the scope of relevancy as it
pertains to social media evidence. Even though it is has been established that there is no
Facebook privilege or privacy expectation in social media postings, a party seeking access to an

10

N.J. CT. R. 4:10-2(a).
See Huie v. Newcomb Hospital, 112 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 1970).
12
N.J.R.E. 401.
11
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adversary’s social media footprint must still establish that the desired information is relevant or
will lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. This relevancy standard has created a bevy of
litigation with parties ardently disputing whether certain postings or messages fall under the
standard’s purview.
A. Who Determines Relevancy
Federal Rule 26(b) and the discovery rules of many states, as exemplified by New
Jersey’s Rule 4:10, hinge the discoverability of evidence on the issue of relevance. While this
may be clear from a plain reading of the rules, what often remains unclear is who determines
what is relevant to the issues and defenses of the case.
When an opposing party requests access to evidence located in an adversary’s social
media accounts, it is often done so through the typical document request for the production of
materials. According to common practice, this means that the party producing the requested
documents reviews them prior to turning them over, making an initial determination of relevancy
as the party will only turn over documents he or she feels are relevant to the case, and
specifically the document request. Thus, in a typical case relevancy is determined by the
producing party, at least initially. Allowing the producing party to initially determine relevance
has proven to be a more favorable alternative than forcing that party to needlessly turn over a
mass of information for the adversary to rummage through freely. While this may seem sensible,
the process can often become problematic because even the most honest party may seek to hide
certain postings under the veil of irrelevance.
When the issue of relevancy becomes contentious, however, courts can be forced to
supervise the discovery process by determining what is relevant, often through in camera
reviews of the materials.13 Although this ensures that the proper evidence is turned over to the
13

Bianca v. North Fork Bancorp, 2012 WL. 5199007 (N.Y. 2012).
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opposing party, judicial supervision of this nature cannot be relied upon as a steadfast measure
for determining relevancy. Such a process is too judicially time-consuming and expensive to be
used in every case involving social media evidence. The litigation process must instead be able
to rely on the honest production of relevant evidence, as determined by the adversaries
themselves, with judicial assistance given only on an as-need basis.

B. Relevancy and Social Media Evidence
Even though the parties initially determine relevancy, courts have been inundated with
social media discovery disputes concerning the relevancy of account information and the
corresponding postings within those accounts. The relevancy standard has proven a rather low
hurdle for parties looking to access an adversary’s social media postings, but at the same time
has also prevented carte blanche invasions of privacy. An adversary does not have the ability to
force the production of all social media evidence. It must limit that discovery to content that is
relevant to the case. Courts are currently defining the scope of relevance with regards to social
media evidence, and, unsurprisingly, many have come to varying conclusions.
An Indiana court recently defined the scope of relevancy for social media discovery as
“any profile, postings, or messages (including status updates, wall comments, causes joined,
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) and social networking site applications for the
claimant… that reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion, feeling, or mental state, as well as
communications that reveal, refer, or relate to events that could reasonably be expected to
produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental state.”14 The defendant employer sought access
to two employees’ Facebook profiles after the E.E.O.C. brought suit for sexual harassment on the
14

E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt, LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 437 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
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employees’ behalves.15 In limiting the scope of discoverability, the court recognized that
discovery does have limits and “the challenge is to define appropriately broad limits – but limits
nevertheless – on the discoverability of social communications in light of a subject as amorphous
as emotional and mental health…”16 The court also stated that a picture posted on a third-party’s
profile in which a litigant is merely tagged in, is less likely to be relevant to the case at hand,
while photographs or videos of third-parties, unrelated to the case at hand, are most likely
irrelevant.17
Similarly, the Eastern District of New York has recognized that the broad nature of
relevancy must be somewhat restrained when confronted with a motion to compel seeking to
force the plaintiff to release all records contained in her social networking accounts.18 The
plaintiff attempted to argue that the request violated her privacy rights and was based on nothing
more than “pure speculation.”19 The defendants, however, contended that the information sought
reflected the plaintiff’s “levels of social interaction and daily functioning” as well as her
“emotional and psychological state.”20 After a lengthy discussion of how other jurisdictions had
managed the issues of social networking discovery and its effect on emotional damages, the
court concluded that plaintiff’s general postings and “routine updates” were not relevant to her
claim of emotional damages.21 However, the plaintiff was required to produce “any specific
references to the emotional distress she claims she suffered or treatment she received in
connection with the incidents underlying her Amended Complaint.”22 In response to plaintiff’s
claim for physical damages the court held that “[p]ostings or photographs on social networking
15

Id. at 430.
Id. at 433.
17
Id. at 436.
18
Giacchetto, 2013 WL 2897054 at *1.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at *4.
22
Id.
16
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websites that reflect physical capabilities inconsistent with a plaintiff’s claimed injury are
relevant.”23 The court went further to require plaintiff to produce “any social networking
postings that refer or relate to any of the events alleged in the Amended Complaint.”24
Courts have continually used the low-burden relevancy standard found within the current
discovery rules to establish that social media evidence should be treated no differently than
evidence the court has been confronting for decades. However, the issue of whether pretrial
discovery can breach the privacy settings of an individual’s account has raised new concerns and
somewhat conflicted rulings.
C. Relevancy and Private Postings
While social media users willingly choose to share information online, many do so with
the belief that they can use privacy settings to control who sees the posted content. Broad
pretrial discovery, however, allows adversarial parties to pierce through these privacy settings to
acquire relevant evidence. Even though parties may go through great lengths to protect certain
postings, there is no social media privilege. Parties to litigation have always been forced to turn
over incredibly personal, and often intrusive, information including medical records and tax
returns. If these materials are not protected discovery, then neither are postings published into
cyberspace, no matter the privacy settings. Unless the party can raise a successful claim of
privilege under Rule 26(c) or parallel state laws, if the information is relevant to the issues at
hand then it is discoverable.25 The general view is that all relevant social media evidence, no
matter its classification as private or public, is discoverable, but some courts have improperly
established relevancy thresholds for obtaining this private information.

23

Id.
Id.
25
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
24
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Generally, relevant information, even in the private sections of these accounts is
discoverable because it is neither privileged nor protected by a common law right of privacy.26
“Merely locking a profile from public access does not prevent discovery.”27 According to the
New York Supreme Court of Suffolk County, the private information located in the plaintiff’s
social media accounts is discoverable given the nature of social networking websites.28 The
court recognized that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in postings
published online and any privacy concerns that could be raised were outweighed by the need for
information and went against the values of New York’s discovery rules.29 “Preventing
[d]efendant from accessing to [p]laintiff’s private postings on Facebook and MySpace would be
in direct contravention to the liberal disclosure policy in New York State.”30 The court also
acknowledged that the public information on plaintiff’s accounts seemingly contained material
evidence that contradicted plaintiff’s personal injury claims.31 According to the court, this meant
a reasonable likelihood existed that the private information of plaintiff’s accounts would contain
other relevant information.32 While the court used this logic to further support its position, other
courts have taken the private-public dichotomy further by demanding a party show the producing
party’s public information was relevant before granting access to any private postings.
These courts create a threshold issue for the discovering party to satisfy: if a party wishes
to access the private information of the social media account, that party must first establish the
public parts of the profile contain information relevant to the issues. The theory seems to be that
26

See Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 11 CIV. 4374 PGG FM, 2012 WL 1197167, *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. April 5,
2012); see also Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Mich. 2012). “The fact that [d]efendant
is seeking social networking information as opposed to traditional discovery materials does not change the Court’s
analysis.”
27
E.E.O.C., 270 F.R.D. at 434.
28
See Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
29
Id. at 656, citing U.S. v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 654.
32
Id.

Richter

11 | P a g e

mere suspicion or speculation that the private contents of an individual’s social media accounts
contain relevant information is not enough to just the production of such information.33 The
logic involved in these holdings places too heavy a burden on the discovering party, given the
nature and dichotomy of private and public social media postings. Generally, information that is
shared privately is more personal and revealing because the posting party believes he or she is in
control of the post’s audience. These postings are more likely to contain relevant information
with regards to emotional and physical well-being than the generic everyday posts that the user
wishes to share with the world. Moreover, some parties may not share any information publicly
and complete shroud all postings or messages. Forcing a litigant to meet the threshold showing
of relevancy as to the public postings improperly parallels the two portions of the adversary’s
profiles and can prevent the disclosure of pertinent evidence.
Even though some courts require this threshold showing, judicial precedent has at least
established that litigants cannot hide their damaging social media postings simply by making
their accounts private. At the very most, this process simply creates another hurdle for the
adversary to overcome during discovery. Regardless of the select group who has access to the
private postings, the fact remains that information is being shared on a digital platform.
Therefore, if the information is relevant, a litigant has a right to access that content. Although the
information is generally deemed discoverable, as long as the low hurdle of relevancy is met, the
judicial precedent has established that there is a method to properly obtaining this information
without clashing with the opposing party or the established values of discovery.
V. How Social Media Evidence Can Be Discovered Properly
Given the amount of information available to opposing parties, it is easy to serve an
opposing party with an overdrawn discovery request that seeks the adversary’s entire social
33

See Mackelprang v. Fid. Nat. Title Agency of Nevada, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-00788-JCM, 2007 WL 119149 (D. Nev.
Jan. 9, 2007).
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media history. Assuredly, if an attorney were to dig through an adversary’s digital footprint long
enough he or she would find something relevant to the disputed issues. However, requesting the
entirety of an individual’s social media accounts runs afoul of the established principle that
discovery should not be disproportionate to the needs of the case. Although this guideline
appears to be well-established, courts have struggled to establish a definitive scope as to what
constitutes proper discovery and what crosses that line into the proverbial fishing expedition.
When confronted with issues of discoverability, courts have consistently reiterated that
the discovery of social media should be equated with the discovery of other evidence. These
courts should therefore hold steadfast to this analogy when determining how that evidence can be
discovered. For example, if a party had in its possession handwritten letters that were relevant to
the claims of the case, that party must turn over those letters in response to a proper discovery
request. However, if that party kept those letters in a large box labeled “correspondence” which
contained all letters that the individual had sent and received over the last several years, that
individual should not have to turn over the entirety of the box for the opposing party’s search for
relevant evidence.34 An individual should not be forced to turn over such personal information
just because relevant evidence may exist somewhere in the box. Similarly, although it is likely
that a party’s social media accounts contain relevant information, that party should not then be
forced to turn over the entirety of the social media accounts for the opposing party to rummage
through freely.
Although parties are entitled to broad pretrial discovery, they are not entitled to turn the
discovery process into an invasive, unfocussed expedition based on nothing more than the mere

34

Steven S. Gensler, Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 7, 15 (2012).
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suspicion or hope that relevant evidence will turn up eventually.35 Neither party has the
“generalized right to rummage at will through information that Plaintiff has limited from public
view.36 Litigants are best served using a narrowly-tailored discovery request that outlines the
material being sought and why that material is relevant to the claims of the case. Courts are
more apt to respond approvingly of these requests that feature some degree of specificity.
For example, in Ford v. United States, the government sought an order compelling
plaintiffs to produce “any documents [,] postings, pictures, messages [,] or entries of any kind on
social media within the covered period relating to [c]laims by plaintiffs or their [e]xperts.”37 The
information sought covered the time period between the incident at issue in the matter and the
date of the discovery request.38 The plaintiffs objected to the request claiming that it was
“invasive, overbroad, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible information.”39
The court recognized that other courts required the production of social media information “in
response to more narrowly tailored requests, such as those relating to events alleged in the
complaint.”40 Accordingly, the court found that the government’s request was not narrowly
tailored because it did not “describe the categories of material sought; rather it reli[ed] on
[p]laintiffs to determine what might be relevant. Thus it is overbroad and vague.”41
Similarly, in response to a defendant’s discovery request seeking plaintiff’s personal
emails and messages sent via a private MySpace account, a Nevada court concluded that the
defendants did not sufficiently establish a relevant basis for acquiring the information other than

35

Tompkins v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2012) quoting McCann v.
Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 910 N.Y.S.2d 614, (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
36
Id.
37
No. CIV. A.DKC11-3039, 2013 WL 3877756 (D. Md. July 25, 2013).
38
Id.
39
Id. at *2.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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the “suspicion that they may contain sexually explicit of secually promiscuous content.”42 The
court reasoned that allowing defendant access to all of the private emails on the plaintiff’s
MySpace accounts would “cast too wide a net” for information that could be relevant which
would lead to the production of irrelevant information.43 However, the court did find that
defendant was entitled to seek information relating to plaintiff’s alleged mental condition via
“properly limited requests for production of relevant email communications.”44
Even with broad pretrial discovery, it is clear that parties are not entitled to mine through
the personal affairs of individuals with nothing more than hopes of finding something relevant.
Such course of action is unjustifiably intrusive and produces too much irrelevant information.
Again, it is best for an attorney seeking social media evidence to serve a narrowly-tailored
request upon the opposing party, rather than utilizing alternative, less favorable means.
VI. Social Media Content Providers & Their Responses to Discovery Requests
Obtaining evidence directly from the social media content provider is rarely, if ever, a
fruitful endeavor. Rather than attempting to obtain information directly from the social media
service, an attorney seeking to uncover the social media exploits of an opposing party should
direct the corresponding discovery requests directly to opposing counsel. Without a court order
or the opposing party’s consent, social media sites are unlikely to respond to any such request.
This is most likely because these companies go to great lengths to ensure the protection of their
users’ private information and risk losing members or facing potential litigation if they were to
compromise that trust. Instead, companies like Facebook and Twitter direct opposing parties to
acquire the information they seek from one another, choosing to remove themselves from the
equation entirely if possible.

42

Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149 at *2.
Id. at *7.
44
Id. at *8.
43
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Although social media content providers have attempted to actively withdraw themselves
from the discovery process, in response to the escalating use of social media evidence in
litigation they have developed tools that allow users to easily download the information
contained within their accounts. For example, Facebook allows users to download their entire
account into one file.45 This makes for a rather simple process to accumulate information that
covers the entire span of the user’s profile timeline. Although lauded for its simplicity, a
commonly overlooked factor of this option is the sheer breadth of what information is included
in this material. The downloaded file contains data of all of the user’s active session on
Facebook (dates, times, devices, IP addresses), a list of ad topics generated based on information
mined from your timeline, complete chat histories, and the places you’ve checked into. 46 Also
included are any friend requests sent or received, any friends the user had at any point in time, a
list of accounts linked to the Facebook account, and any messages the account sent or received
except those that have been previously deleted.47 While it is clear that this information could be
incredibly useful in litigation, the sheer breadth is overwhelming and involves significant activity
conducted by third-parties. When a litigant turns over such downloaded information, he or she is
also turning over posts, messages, and photos produced by non-parties to the litigation that may
have their own privacy concerns. With tools like these available, some courts have disfavored
claims of that producing evidence from social media accounts is unduly burdensome.48
Services like Facebook provide these tools to prevent users from being forced into
turning over their login credentials to another individual. According to Facebook’s Terms of
Service, users are not permitted to share their password with a third party or allow a third party
45

Downloading Your Information, https://www.facebook.com/help/131112897028467 (last visited December 3,
2013).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See In re White Tail Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., CIV.A. 11-0009, 2012 WL 4857777 (E.D. La. Oct. 11, 2012).
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to access their account. Specifically, the terms of service read “You will not share your
password (or in the case of developers, your secret key), let anyone else access your account or
do anything else that might jeopardize the security of your account.”49 When a litigation storm
erupted when employers began delving into the accounts of employees and potential employees,
Facebook’s Chief Privacy Officer Erin Egan, stated, “[Y]ou should never have to share your
password, let anyone access your account, or do anything that might jeopardize the security of
your account or violate the privacy of your friends. We have worked really hard at Facebook to
give you the tools to control who sees your information.”50 In an era where digital privacy
concerns are at an all-time high, Facebook and other social media websites have actively
withdrawn from litigation between third-parties. Facebook’s stance favoring privacy, however,
stands in direct contrast with jurisdictions that have forced individuals to turn over their login
credentials to the opposing party.
Moreover, litigants seeking to acquire social media information from the platforms
themselves can run afoul of the Stored Communications Act. In Crispin v. Christian Audigier,
Inc., for example, the defendants served subpoenas on third-party websites, including Facebook
and MySpace, seeking to discover plaintiff’s messages and other related content.51 Although the
lower court had denied the plaintiff’s motion to quash the subpoenas, the Federal District Court
for the Central District of California seemed to rule that the private communications that take
place on social media sites are protected from disclosure by third-parties in civil suits whether or

49

Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook (last updated Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited December 3, 2013).
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not they were disseminated through a public or partially public section of the site.52 The court
reasoned that the social media platforms did fall under the purview of the Act as electronic
communication services and that the information sought was electronic storage.53 Therefore,
even though the postings could potentially be displayed to a wide audience, the legislative
history of the statute indicated a desire to “protect the electronic communications that are
configured to be private, such as private electronic bulletin boards.”54 Although the decision was
not clear-cut and the reasoning was a bit murky, the Stored Communications Act in general is a
murky piece of legislation that attorneys should seek to avoid.
Attorneys should therefore avoid subpoenaing the social media content provider, and
instead seek the information through other avenues, though there are pitfalls there as well.
VII. Ethical Issues of Mining Social Media Accounts
Attorneys have taken various routes in understanding and utilizing the evidence available
on social media platforms. It is of no surprise that some attorneys have taken to scrupulous
means of acquiring damning evidence against an adversary, while others have held steadfast in
their ways by ignoring the websites altogether. As the landscape continues to expand, however,
ethics committees and bar associations around the country are currently setting the standards for
practicing in an increasingly digital age, and the process has had far-reaching ramifications for
all practicing attorneys.
Given the explosive nature of the content and the novel issues it raises, attorneys have
clashed with significant ethical issues both in the collection of the evidence and in monitoring
their clients’ use of social media evidence, which can give rise to spoliation claims. The most
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significant of these ethical developments is that lawyers are now being held responsible for
understanding the technology and its legal implications.
A. Attorneys Have an Ethical Responsibility to Mine Social Networks
Social media evidence has reached a stage where it is too significant to ignore. There is
now a wealth of evidence that is easily discoverable and potentially determinative of the outcome
of a case. The popularity of social media has reached a point where social media discovery
attempts should now be considered a necessity for any practicing attorney, no matter the field,
and attorneys that ignore social media evidence can be subjected to charges for ineffective
assistance of counsel.55
At this point in the digital era, attorneys who fail to search for relevant social media
evidence or search improperly cannot shield themselves from liability by claiming a lack of
understanding. Social media has become such a key issue that attorneys that do not comprehend
the importance of social media evidence, how to discover it, or the social media activity of their
clients may be subjected to legal malpractice actions.56 Although a malpractice claim would
only be successful upon a showing that the social media evidence would have made a difference
in the outcome of the case, ignoring social media poses too substantial a threat to an attorney’s
reputation and financial well-being.57
In a report filed in May 2012, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 stated that
technology “has irrevocably changed and continues to alter the practice of law in fundamental
ways. Lawyers must understand technology in order to provide clients with the competent and
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cost-effective services that they expect and deserve.”58 The law is a dynamic field, and although
the technology is a new phenomenon, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have long held
attorneys responsible for continually updating their legal education. According to Model Rule
1.1, “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
representation.”59 Specifically, Comment 6 to the Rule, reads: “To maintain the requisite
knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice,
including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology…”60 Staying “abreast”
involves understanding technology’s effect on legal research and conducting discovery.61
“These tasks now require lawyers to have a firm grasp on how electronic information is created,
stored, and received.”62 According to the Ethics Commission, “a lawyer would have difficulty
providing competent legal services in today’s environment without knowing how to use email or
create an electronic document.”63
In the digital era, it is not surprising that courts are progressively placing duties on
attorneys to effectively use technology for the benefit of their clients. At one point in time, using
the resources of the internet and technology in general was a competitive advantage. Now,
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however, it has become mandatory practice.64 Attorneys must understand how to use technology
and must actively convey that knowledge to their clients once litigation has begun. It is also
becoming increasingly clear that attorneys must also know how to look for this information
without being charged with ethics or conduct violations which can be a tricky endeavor given
recent ethics rulings from several jurisdictions.
B. Ethically Mining Social Media Websites
Given the significance and growth of social media, attorneys must understand the proper
procedures for discovering the relevant evidence contained therein. The Rules of Professional
Conduct currently delineate what an attorney can and cannot do when communicating with
adversaries and third parties. These rules are being tested by communications that take place via
social media platforms, and ethics commissions from multiple states have reached drastically
different conclusions as to what constitutes proper behavior on social media.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct have been adopted in some form in every state
except for California. Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 8.4, a
lawyer who engages in conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation can be the subject of a
professional misconduct action.65 Specifically, a lawyer cannot “engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”66 Given the focus of the rule on intentional
deception, it would appear that an attorney sending a friend request to an individual without
anything more would be free from any potential claims. After all, the individual receiving the
request is free to decline it and maintain exclusive control of their information. However, this is
not always the case because at least one ethics committee has ruled that the attorney’s hidden
agenda is controlling. While it may seem illogical to equate a simple friend request with acts of
64
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fraud and deceit, divergent holdings make it unclear whether an attorney has to disclose why that
individual is receiving the request at issue or be at risk for not disclosing a material fact.
The Model Rules provide another potential trap for attorneys delving into the digital
world in search of treasure. Model Rule 4.2 prohibits any communication between an attorney
and an adversary known to be represented by another attorney without consent.67 While it may
seem clever to work around this rule by involving the assistance of third-party investigators,
Rules 5 and 8.4 force attorneys to shoulder the blame for communications made for those
working under them. It is important to note, however, that separate rules exist for employees of
the government or prosecutors who may be permitted to act in undercover investigations to
discern information. Investigations on social networking websites require the same analysis as
traditional undercover investigations, but with some new twists, especially regarding the
propriety of friend requests.
It seems clear that a Facebook request would fall under the type of communication
prohibited by the aforementioned rules regarding communications with a represented adversary.
But this should not stop an attorney from performing social media due diligence to determine if
the opposing party has publicly available information such as blogs or other postings that could
be accessed without communicating directly with the opposing party. Obviously if an attorney
were to discover pertinent information after running an adversary’s name through the search
engines available on Google or Facebook, no ethics violations could be raised. These individuals
are putting the information out there for the entire world to view so in the eyes of the rules
governing attorneys it is all fair game, as should be the case. Additionally, according to at least
one state’s ethics committee, the simple fact that an attorney has to register on the website or
create a profile to access the information does not prevent that information from being
67
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considered public.68 If, however, the targeted individual has set up a network or private profile
with the very intention of preventing people from viewing his or her profile, then any deceitful
act of attempting to acquire this information through misrepresentations could potentially open
the lawyer up to ethics violations.
According to the Philadelphia Committee on Legal Ethics, any Facebook friend request
sent to a third party, even if sent from an honest personal account, is deceptive and in violation of
Rule 8.4 unless that friend request discloses the attorney is seeking to find information relevant
to an ongoing case.69 According to the committee, an attorney acts deceptively by failing to
advise the targeted third party of “a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who asks to
be allowed access to the witness's pages is doing so only because he or she is intent on obtaining
information and sharing it with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the
witness.”70 Although the attorney attempted to argue that viewing the individual’s Facebook
profile directly compared to the legal and ethical practice of videotaping an individual in public,
the court found little solace in this comparison because in this case the attorney had to first
request permission of the targeted individual to access the desired information.71 The committee
stated that deceptively seeking to access the individual’s Facebook profile was similar to the
attorney wearing a disguise and sneaking into the individual’s home.72 Rather than taking the
Facebook request at face value, the committee instead chose to focus on the attorney’s hidden
intent in making the request even though the individual had the power to refuse the request and
therefore block any type of investigation.73
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The San Diego County Bar Association’s Legal Ethics Committee ruled similarly when it
determined that a lawyer may not ethically make ex parte friend requests to represented third
parties.74 The Committee held that under no circumstances may an attorney friend request a
represented party’s profile, but that attorney may send a request to an unrepresented individual
only after disclosing the true nature of the request, i.e. that the request is for litigation purposes.75
Although the attorney was free to access publicly shared information, a line had to be drawn to
prevent attorneys from “intruding on the attorney-client relationship of opposing parties and
surreptitiously circumventing the privacy even of those who are unrepresented.”76
Viewing the same issue in a completely opposite manner, the New York City Committee
on Legal Ethics held that no ethical violations occur if an attorney uses a truthful, personal
account to send a friend request to an unrepresented third party.77 Unlike the Philadelphia
Committee, the New York City Committee found that no material misrepresentations were being
made because the account contained only truthful information about the attorney and the targeted
individual had the choice to allow this stranger access to his or her personal information.78
According to his committee, an attorney cannot be found to violate Model Rule 4.1 unless that
attorney uses a false profile or some form of false information to access the individual’s
account.79
The Philadelphia Bar Professional Guidance Committee also reiterated the belief that
these same principles apply to an agent of that attorney who uses a social media account to friend
the opposing party. The Committee determined that an attorney acts deceptively if he or she
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uses a third-party investigator to acquire information from someone using a friend request.80
Although the court recognized that the investigator did not dupe the opposing party into
accepting the friend request in any way besides sending the invite, deception could be found in
that the investigator chose to omit “a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who asks
to be allowed access to the witness's pages is doing so only because he or she is intent on
obtaining information and sharing it with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony
of the witness.”81 This ruling is directly in line with the Philadelphia Committee’s prior ruling as
again an emphasis was placed on the hidden intent of the attorney.
It is clear that even though most jurisdictions have adopted similar rules of professional
conduct, the application of those rules varies and attorneys seeking social media discovery must
be wary of the precedent established in their jurisdictions before taking any course of action.
C. Maintaining Social Media Evidence: Claims for Spoliation
With the inadvertent click of a mouse years of relevant evidence can be permanently
deleted. When electronic data is involved in litigation, an attorney should take affirmative steps
to ensure that the evidence is neither destroyed nor altered in any way. With litigation either
ongoing or pending, there is a real danger that the adversaries may remove damning content from
their accounts to better serve their needs. No matter how damning or embarrassing the evidence
may be, attorneys are strictly prohibited from destroying evidence.82 When this evidence is
deleted it can give rise to spoliation claims, as exemplified by two recent cases from New Jersey
and Virginia.
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In Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc., the plaintiff allegedly sustained several injuries as a
result of an accident caused by defendant United Air Lines.83 The plaintiff claimed his injuries
left him disabled and severely limited his ability to participate in physical and social activities.84
During discovery, the defendants sought information relating to the plaintiff’s Facebook account
and the plaintiff refused.85 Judge Waldor ordered the plaintiff to release the information, and the
plaintiff acquiesced by changing his password to allow the defendants access to his account.86
The plaintiff, however, deactivated his account shortly thereafter and all of the information was
permanently lost.87 The defendants claimed that what information they did acquire from
Facebook was contrary to the plaintiff’s injury claims as they showed the plaintiff participating
in numerous social and physical activities.88 The court recognized that the plaintiff’s Facebook
account was relevant to the litigation because plaintiff alleged to have sustained serious injuries
that limited his ability to work and engage in certain other physical activities.89 While spoliation
was not an issue in the case, the plaintiff clearly destroyed relevant evidence that could have
played a role in the outcome of the case.
If a party to a case purposefully destroys relevant social media evidence, even if acting
under the advice of counsel, that party and the responsible attorney will be subjected to
spoliation claims and potentially significant sanctions. This was the case in Allied Concrete Co.
v. Lester, where the plaintiff company sought access to the defendant’s Facebook profile and the
photographs contained within it.90 After the plaintiff acquired a photo that portrayed the
defendant in a poor light, the defendant’s attorney, through a paralegal, instructed the defendant
83
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to “clean up” his Facebook page because “[we don’t] want blow ups of other pictures at trial.”91
The defendant then proceeded to delete a significant number of photographs from his profile.92
Even though these photos were eventually obtained and Lester prevailed at trial, the court
ordered sanctions in the amount of $180,000 against Lester and $542,000 against his attorneys.93
Besides fines, sanctions for spoliation can include fee-shifting, special jury instructions
such as adverse inference charges, outright preclusion of certain evidence or issues, or even the
entry of default judgment or dismissal. Although not etched in stone, generally, the duty to
preserve evidence begins before litigation, when litigation is likely.94
VIII. Issues Arising After the Discovery Phase
While determining the discoverability of social media evidence is a daunting task in and
of itself, it is also a prelude to a much larger battle. Attorneys must still get this type of evidence
admitted if they wish to use it at trial. This evidence must therefore withstand the evidentiary
rules concerning 403 balancing, hearsay, and the best evidence rule. This can prove difficult
given the nature of social media. Some courts have expressed the view that evidence taken from
social media accounts possesses no more evidentiary uncertainty than written documents, given
that written documents and signatures can be easily forged.95 Other courts have taken a harder
look at just how easily social media postings and profiles can be manipulated, requiring the
proponent of the evidence to establish not only that the postings came from the individual’s
account, but that they were in fact specifically created by that individual.96 Either way, a
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competent attorney will want to fully understand the steps required to properly authenticate this
increasingly popular evidence if that attorney wants to realize the full benefit of such material.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and similar state-specific evidence rules, to admit
evidence, a litigant must establish that the evidence is (1) relevant, (2) authentic, and (3) not
subject to being excluded under the hearsay rules. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)
evidence can be authenticated by “[t]estimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be,” or by the
“[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics taken in
conjunction with circumstances.”97 Electronically stored information, specifically, can be
authenticated under Rule 901(b)(4) if the producing party has supporting evidence that shows the
“contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics” of the evidence.98
Getting social media evidence admitted into court does not require authentication by a
representative of the social media service provider.99 Messages or postings can be authenticated
through the testimony of the individual who authored the postings. The easiest way to properly
authenticate social media evidence, however, is to obtain an admission from the account holder.
This can be done through deposition testimony or a notice to admit. If for some reason this is not
possible, and the circumstantial evidence of distinguishing characteristics is not sufficient, the
proponent of the evidence can hire an e-discovery expert to electronically trace the postings.
This alternative, however, can prove quite time-consuming and significantly expensive.
The evidentiary issues surrounding the authentication and admissibility have been best
represented in criminal cases.100 In Griffin v. State, for example, the state attempted to use
printouts from the MySpace page of the defendant’s girlfriend by having a police officer
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authenticate the pages.101 The postings on the profile allegedly contained threats to eyewitnesses
of the murder.102 The court recognized that “anyone can create a fictitious account and
masquerade under another person’s name or can gain access to another’s account by obtaining
the user’s username and password.”103 Even though the profile from which the evidence was
taken contained the girlfriend’s correct birthday, location, and photographs, the court found that
the state failed to lay a proper foundation for admitting the evidence because there was a
possibility that the profile was created by a third party or was hacked by someone at the time of
the postings.104 According to the court, there was too great of a potential for abuse or
manipulation to admit the evidence.105 The court also laid out several alternative methods the
state could have taken to properly authenticate the postings, including asking the individual if
she did in fact create the profile and subsequent postings, examining the individual’s laptop and
internet history, and contacting the social media website directly.106
Some courts, however, focus on the user’s social media profile and its degree of
customization or individualization as a means for authenticating the evidence at issue.
Distinguishing Griffin, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas recently utilized “circumstantial
indicia of authenticity” to admit disputed MySpace postings.107 Those indicia included
photographs of the appellant displaying his unique, gang-related tattoos, a registered email
address that included a nickname the appellant was known to go by, and revealing messages to
other MySpace users.108 Affirming the lower court’s admittance of the evidence, the court
reasoned that this evidence “taken as a whole with all of the individual, particular details
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considered in combination” was enough to conclude that the MySpace pages did indeed belong
to the appellant.109 This reasoning was consistent with that displayed by the lower court, which
ruled:
“The inherent nature of social networking websites encourages members who choose to
use pseudonyms to identify themselves by posting profile pictures or descriptions of their
physical appearances, personal backgrounds, and lifestyles. This type of individualization
is significant in authenticating a particular profile page as having been created by the
person depicted in it. The more particular and individualized the information, the greater
the support for a reasonable juror's finding that the person depicted supplied the
information.”110
Getting social media evidence properly authenticated and subsequently admitted at trial
can be incredibly difficult if the proper precautions are not taken. Attorneys must be wary of
these evidentiary hurdles, even if it appears obvious that the individual was responsible for
publishing the postings or creating the account. The authentication of such evidence is another
concern that practicing attorneys must familiarize themselves with in order to properly represent
their clients in the digital era.
IX. How to Handle Social Media Issues
With new websites popping up every day, the rise of social media is more of a revolution
than a fad. Lawyers in all fields must better equip themselves to deal with the issues that arise
from their clients’ use of these social mediums to better serve them in whatever endeavor. While
it would be unethical to advise a client to delete their social media presence, an attorney must
also be proactive and warn a client that opposing counsel is entitled to this type of evidence if it
is relevant to the issues at hand. Forewarning a client that this is a likely possibility will ease the
potential invasive feelings of having someone dig through one’s online identity. Social media
evidence cannot be ignored, but at the same time raises numerous ethical considerations. This
109
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dichotomy can create a fine line around which attorneys must tread lightly whenever social
media evidence could come into play.
For those attorneys seeking to uncover social media evidence from opposing parties, the
best route is to be as specific as possible in a narrowly-tailored discovery request. An attorney
who notifies the opposing party that he or she is searching only for content that is relevant to the
case at hand will better serve that attorney if complications or objections are raised down the
line. Additionally, rather than attempting to acquire the specified party’s login credentials, the
simpler and more preferred route is to have that party use the tools already available to download
and then turnover the relevant information. This way less of an invasion occurs as the opposing
party remains in control of his or her account and the parties can avoid potential clashes with the
Stored Communications Act. Individuals are more apt to turn over information in their exclusive
control rather than letting multiple individuals peruse through their online accounts, especially
when their login credentials may include a password that is attached to accounts on different
websites not relevant to the litigation, such as banking or retail websites. Furthermore, a
narrowly-tailored request directed at specific information has a much greater opportunity of
withstanding any objections under the current discovery rules.
In terms of acquiring the information outside the procedural guidelines of the discovery
rules, an attorney should proceed with caution. If the information is posted to a public profile, it
is fair game and an attorney can, and should, extract the postings for relevant evidence. If,
however, the information can only be found on a private account, an attorney should look to its
local or state bar association or similar ethics committees for guidance. Unless these committees
have specifically ruled on the issues, the private account is better accessed through more formal
discovery methods.
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Finally, given the constant flow of the digital world, lawyers must stay abreast of what is
going on in the social landscape and how courts are responding. Technology and social media
are rapidly advancing and a website that was not on the scene a year ago could become the next
social-media goldmine. An attorney who fails to keep-up could jeopardize their client’s case and
their own professional well-being under the developing rules of attorney conduct. Navigating
the social media minefield may seem daunting, especially for attorneys who do not quite
comprehend the services. Because of social media’s explosion, however, it is a necessary evil
for any attorney.
X. Remaining Issues
Because social media platforms are constantly evolving and changing the ways people
communicate, it seems that no hardline rules can be drafted that will fully encompass the mass of
evidence drawn from these accounts. Therefore, courts will continually have to confront new
and often complicated issues that will arise from the popularity of these platforms. Already,
several prominent issues remain unresolved but may prove arduous to deal with in the near
future.
With the continual push for increased social interaction, one question that probably
cannot be answered with an exact definition is what exactly constitutes a social media account.
While sites like Facebook and Twitter clearly fall into this category, a line has not yet been
drawn for other, less socially-focused content providers such as retail outlets like Amazon or
gaming services like Steam or Xbox Live. It remains unclear whether a discovery request
seeking a litigant’s social media account information obligates that litigant to turn over the
credentials to these types of platforms. Amazon operates primarily as a retail agent but allows
users to publish communications through reviews or other comments. Gaming communities also
contain significant communications that could prove valuable for opposing counsel. If a party
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claims extreme emotional distress but has been routinely and jubilantly participating in social
gaming, opposing counsel would surely like access to any online communications that may
divulge the true state of the complaining party’s mentality. More and more websites and online
platforms are offering some form of social interaction for users to accompany their primary
services. It is unclear whether these websites must be categorized as social media accounts for
discovery purposes.
Similarly, courts may have to define the scope of what constitutes a “document” for
social media purposes. In general, the discovery rules, both federal and often state, refer to
discovery and relevancy of a document. Rather than determining the relevancy of an entire
collection of letters or other writings, the relevancy standard is generally applied on a documentby-document basis. While one letter or journal entry may be relevant, the rest of the collection
may not be. Courts have not determined what constitutes a document when social media
evidence comes into play. A post on Facebook, a single “Tweet” on Twitter, or even a blog
entry can all constitute a document, but the issue become whether a collection of posts or blogs
from a single day, hour, or month also constitute a document. While it may not appear to be that
significant of an issue, it comes into play when determining what a party should have to turn
over in response to discovery requests and whether that party has the right to black-out or hide
certain postings surrounding a post relevant to the issue at hand.
Additionally, courts will have to eventually deal with the potential consequences of
allowing counsel complete to a party’s social media accounts if this trend were to continue. By
forcing an individual to turn over his or her login credentials, the integrity of that social media
account can be compromised, either purposefully or unintentionally. In today’s society, it is no
secret that some individuals take great pride in their social media profiles and expend countless
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hours building a reputation or achieving certain feats in their online arenas. By submitting to a
court order to turn over all login credentials, these individuals could be placing their online
profiles at significant risk as a single accidental click could damage their online persona or even
career. While integrity would ensure that nothing is done purposefully or vindictively,
reparations such as sanctions may not be enough to repair a damaged profile, especially given the
importance social media places on an online reputation.
Another issue that has not yet taken center stage but surely has the potential to, involves a
website’s terms of service and potential violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, an
already muddied piece of legislation that has seen its fair share of criticism. Under the Act an
individual can be subject to significant criminal or civil liability for fraudulently accessing a
computer “without authorization.”111 Additionally, if an attorney were to create a fake account
to access an individual’s information the attorney would most likely be violating that service’s
terms of service for providing false information, which would again have the potential of running
afoul of the Act. Whether an attorney could face culpability for attempting to access the social
media accounts of an opposing party is unclear, but the broad and murky language of the act
should put attorneys on notice that improper actions in the digital world are often not clearly
defined but strictly punished.
Given the nature of social media and the fact that it can be deleted with the click of a
mouse, rather than imposing significant penalties like sanctions or adverse inference charges
after the damage has been done, it would be a better practice for all courts to implement litigation
holds as soon as possible. This process would mandate that all parties retain social media
postings or other electronically stored information that relates to the case at hand. While this
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process already exists at the federal level, and has been adopted by some state courts as well,112 it
should become uniform practice. This would obviate a great deal of spoliation litigation that
currently plagues the courts concerning this type of frequently inflammatory evidence.
One of the often overlooked features of social media is the braggadocio that is often
involved in the postings. Opposing parties and courts will currently have to struggle with what is
truthful and what is not, because what one sees on social media is not always the entire story.
Social norms and general human nature encourage users to post more about the positive
occurrences in their lives as opposed to the drab or dreary. “Litigants’ internal sentiments do not
necessarily manifest in observable form, and therefore emotionally damaged or remorseful
litigants would likely not post pictorial evidence of their true feelings on Facebook.”113 This can
lead to tricky situations during discovery and at trial. As the Giachetto court recognized, “[t]he
fact that an individual may express some degree of joy, happiness, or sociability on certain
occasions sheds little light on the issue of whether he or she is actually suffering emotional
distress.”114
Finally, with regard to attorney ethics and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
courts may have to specifically delineate what kind of speech actions like a “friend request” on
Facebook or a “follow” on Twitter represents. While it is clear that an attorney using a false
profile to garner information is acting unethically, it has not yet been uniformly established
whether using a personal account with true information could constitute deception or a
misrepresentation. This type of analysis would hinge on what a friend request or a follow
actually means. The ethics committees from New York and Philadelphia have already
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demonstrated divergent views as to the nature and intent inherent in sending a Facebook friend
request. A friend request on Facebook could mean that the individual wants to share in a
legitimate social relationship online. It could also mean that upon accepting the request, an
individual is granting that new “friend” complete and unfettered access to a bevy of personal
information even though the identity of the individual is unknown. It all depends on how the act
of sending the request is interpreted and the true meaning behind it. Courts and bar associations
must determine whether a friend request, sent from a personal account, can still be deceptive in
that it materially misrepresents the relationship the attorney is establishing with the third party or
fails to be forthcoming with all the material facts. Each social media platform has its own
terminology and methods for allowing users to share information. There are Tweets, posts,
blogs, likes, shares, retweets, subscriptions, and favorites, just to name a few. Because it is
unclear what these actions communicate to others, courts will continue to struggle with the
ethical issues that social media presents.
The creation and commercialization of each new social media platform only creates more
issues for the courts to confront. While it remains to be seen how courts will continue to handle
these issues, it is clear that the current digital era provides a bevy of information that will
continue to be mined for litigation. The only true weapon courts can wield in battling the
confrontations that arise is a better understanding of the technology and the platforms being
utilized. Just as lawyers must keep abreast of the interplay between technology and the law, the
legal system must also be held to the same standard.
XI. Conclusion
Continued advances in technology may eventually force legislatures to draft new rules of
discovery specifically tailored to social media, but until then courts will determine these
discovery issues using the existing rules of discovery. While this process has allowed courts to
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maintain the status quo, attorneys have not been able to successfully escape the effects of the
social media blitzkrieg on society. With new rules of conduct and ethics being generated by bar
associations in each state, responsible attorneys must understand and adapt to the issues the
technology presents. Failure to do so will jeopardize not only their clients’ cases but also their
standing in the legal community. The social media fervor is not fading, and its rise has forever
altered the way people communicate on a daily basis. Both attorneys and the judicial system as a
whole will continue to feel its effects and must continue to adapt as the technology progresses
and its legal use amplifies.
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